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This paper provides (1) a review of the empiricali earnings manage- 
ment literature, (2) a discussion of the institutional differences be- 
tween Anglo-Saxon and non Anglo-Saxon countries and (3) an 
assessment of  the impact of  institutional differences on earnings 
management. 
As (accounting) earnings can be considered an important summa- 
ry statistic of  a firin's financial performance, one can question whe- 
ther managers do  not "manage9'  those earnings. Ht  is elear that finan- 
cial, investment and operational decisions can Pnfluence earnings. 
However, accounting decisions too can be used to manage earnings 
in a particular direction, for GAAP leave some discretion to manag- 
ers in reporting the financial position and operating results of  their 
organizatisn. Examples of  accounting decisions that can influence 
earnings are  accrual decisions, accountinggroceduire choices aizdclian- 
ges, timing of adoptiolm of a mamdated accou~iting  change, and the lik. 
Earnings management has been researched in the literahre both 
analytically and empiricaiily.  Analytica1 models (see, for example, Lam- 
bert (19846, Demksi et al. (1984), Verreechic! (1986), Dye (1988), Triae- 
man and Titman (1988), Fudenberg end Tirole (1995), Evans and 
Sridhar (1996)) study conditions under which earnings management 
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version of  this paper. can occur, whereas empirical studies document instances of earnings 
management (Schipper (1989)). In this paper, we limit ourselves to a 
review of the empirical earnings management literature. 
The review provides some evidence that managers have incentives 
to manage earnings, that they do actually engage in earnings manage- 
ment and that there are factors that constrain their ability to manage 
earnings. Some studies report also on the consequences of  actual or 
assumed earnings management. Most empirical studies were per- 
formed in Anglo-Saxon countries. Since there exist institutional dif- 
ferences between Anglo-Saxon and non Anglo-Saxon countries, we 
argue that the factors that create incentives for and constraints on 
earnings management may be different for these environments, and 
some results of Anglo-Saxon studies may not hold in non Anglo- Saxon 
countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second sec- 
tion presents a literature review. The third section discusses the insti- 
tutional differences between Anglo-Saxon and non Anglo-Saxon coun- 
tries. An assessment of their viable impact on factors that create in- 
centives and constraints on earnings management is provided in sec- 
tion four. We conclude with a summary. 
11.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Empirica1 studies mainly report on the incentives to manage earn- 
ings. Some recent empirical studies also examine factors that might 
constrain earnings management. The following paragraphs give an 
overview of (1)  the incentives to manage earnings, (2) the factors that 
might constrain and (3) the consequences of  earnings management. 
A.  Incentives 
Incentives to manage earnings may stem from the existence of expli- 
cit and implicit contracts, a firm's relations with capita1 markets, the 
need for external financing, the politica1 and regulatory process or se- 
veral specific circumstances. A firm may also be induced to engage in 
a specific type of earnings management, i.e. income smoothing. 1. Explicit and implicit contracts 
A first category of incentives examined stems from the contracting li- 
terature. In the early literature it is often argued that earnings ma- 
nagement is induced by the existence of  explicit contracts, for exam- 
ple bonus plans and debt covenants. The recent literature, however, 
also focuses on inaplicit contracts, as a source of  earnings manage- 
ment incentives. The main concern that "drives" these studies, is that, 
although the flexibility provided by GAAP can improve efficient con- 
tracting, managers might use this flexibility to act opportunistically. 
A first well established hypothesis in the empirical financial ac- 
counting literature is that bonus plans based on accounting earnings 
might induce managers to manage (manipulate) earnings through 
their accounting procedure and accrual decisions, in order to increase 
their cash compensation. More specifically, early studies test the bo- 
nus plan hypothesis, which states that "Ceteris paribus, managers of 
firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose accounting proce- 
dures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the current 
period"  (Watts and Zimmerman (1986), p.208). Later studies exa- 
mined related and more refined hypotheses using different measures 
of  earnings management and using other datasets. Examples of  stu- 
dies on the bonus plan hypothesis include Healy (1985), McNichols 
and Wilsoii (1988), Gaver et al. (1995), Holthausen et al. (1995) and 
Dechow et al. (1996). Although the early literature finds evidence that 
is generally consistent with the bonus plan hypothesis (Watts and Zim- 
Inerman (19901, p.138), more recent studies document mixed results 
(that is, results differ when other datasets and measures of  earning 
management are used). This comes as no surprise, as Watts and Zim- 
mermaii ((1990), p.139) argue that the early tests are not very pow- 
erful, because they rely on simplifications of the (contracting) theory. 
Another well established hypothesis in the contracting literature is 
that the (1) existence of andior (2) closeness to debt covenants might 
induce managers to manipulate accounting earnings. Early empirica1 
studies ihat test the covenant based hypothesis use leverage as a proxy 
for (1) the existence of andl or (2) closeness to debt covenants. In fact, 
they test what is called the debtiequity hypothesis. More specifically, it 
is hypothesized that "Ceteris paribus, the larger a firm's debtlequity 
ratio, the more likely the firm's manager is to select accounting pro- 
cedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the cur- 
rent period."  (Watts and Zimmerman (1986), p.216). Later studies provide "direct"  evidence of the covenant based hypothesis. DeFond 
and Jiainbalvo (1994) and Sweeney (19941, for example, contribute 
to the literature because they do not use a proxy, but base their study 
of  the covenant based hypothesis on a sample of  firms that actually 
reported to haveviolated debt covenants. Other studies include: Dechow 
et al. (1996) and DeAngelo (1994). Except for the DeAngelo (1994) 
study, both the early accounting choice studies, which use proxies, and 
more recent research, which circumvents the use of such proxies, doc- 
ument (in general) evidence consistent with the covenant based hy- 
gothesis. 
The above evidence suggests that explicit contracts have an impact 
on earnings management throiigh accounting decisions. Bowen et al. 
(1995) and Kasanen et al. (1996) examine whether implicit contracts 
(tl-iai is, for example, implicit contracts between the firm and its cus- 
tomers, suppliers, short-term creditors, employees, capita1 providers 
and other stakeholders) do also influence managers' accounting de- 
cisions. Both studies find evidence which is consistent with implicit 
contracts inducing earnings management. Moreover, Bowen et al. 
(1995) find that implicit contracts can explain cross-sectional vari- 
ante in firms' accounting procedure choices in addition to traditional 
variables, for example, the proxies for the explicit contracts men- 
tioned above, that is bonus plans and debt covenants. However, the 
literature on implicit contracting incentives is rather new and Limi- 
ted, and so it seems too early to draw general conclusions. 
2.  Capital markets and need for external financing 
The contracting perspective  is not the only way to look at manage- 
ment's accounting decisions. An alternative is to address those deci- 
sions from a capita1 market perspective (see, for example, Healy and 
Palepu (1993)). In general, research findings provide empirica1 evi- 
dence that a firm's relation with capita1  markets can create incentives 
to influence earnings. Some of  those studies expect firms to manage 
earnings opportunistically (Shivakumar (1998), Dechow et al. (1996), 
Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998)). Other studies consider that 
earnings may be managed in order to communicate private informa- 
tion to investors (Subramanyam (1996), Neill et al. (1995)). Subra- 
manyam (1996), for example, finds supportive evidence of the hypo- 
thesis that managers use discretionary accruals to communicate in- 
formation about future profitability, that is the economic value of the firm. Also the findings of  Neill et al. (1995) suggest that accounting 
method choice can signa1 firm value. Dechow et al. (1996) test whe- 
ther managers manipulate earnings to influence investor's percep- 
tion of firm value in order to be able (1) to raise additional financing 
on more favorable terms or (2) to sell their stockholdings for a higher 
price. They find that the need for external financing seems to be an 
important motive to explain managers engaging in earnings manipu- 
lation, whereas insider trading seems to be less important. Some re- 
cent studies find that earnings are managed prior to or around initia1 
public offerings (Friedlan (1994), Aharony et al. (1993), Neill et al. 
(1995)) or seasoned equity offerings (Shivakumar (1998), Rangan 
(1998), Teoh et al. (1998)). 
3.  Political and regulatory process 
The politica1 and regulatory process through, for example, taxes, rate 
regulation and investigations by regulatory agencies may als0 create 
incentives to manage earnings (see, for example, Watts and Zimmer- 
man (1986)). A hypothesis often tested in accounting choice studies 
is thepolitical cast hypothesisl size hypothesis, which states that "Ce- 
teris paribus, the larger the firm, the more likely the manager is to 
choose accounting procedures that defer reported earnings from cur- 
rent to future periods" (Watts and Zimmerman (1986), p.235). Note 
that formulating the hypothesized impact of the politica1 and regula- 
tory process this way, assumes that larger firms are more political sen- 
sitive than smaller firms. Recent research on the impact of  the poli- 
tical and regulatory process on earnings management includes Jones 
(1991), Guenther (1994), Bowen et al. (1995), Hunt et al. (1996), Key 
(1997) and Han and Wang (1998). In general, one can conclude that 
prior research provides evidence consistent with earnings manage- 
ment induced by the politica1 or regulatory processes. 
4.  Specific circumstances 
There exist also some studies that examine whether specific circum- 
stances induce earnings management. Liberty and  immerm man (1986), 
for example, study the impact of labor union contract negotiations on 
managers' accounting decisions, but do, however, not find evidence 
of  earnings management. And DeAngelo (1988) examined whether 
proxy contests create incentives for managers to influence earnings 
and finds evidence consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, it seems that, during the election carnpaign, managers use their accoun- 
ting discretion to create a favorable picture of their performance. 
Finally, a recent study (Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)) finds evi- 
dence consistent with the hypothesis that earnings are managed to 
avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
5.  Bncome smoothing 
Some studies examine a specific type of earnings managemenit, i.e. in- 
come smoothing. The hypothesis is that managers might manage ear- 
nings to reduce the variability of reported earnings or to align repor- 
teed  earnings with expected earnings. Explanations for income smoo- 
thing inclerde job protection and avoidance of  shareholder Pnterfer- 
ence, tax avoidance, irnproving terrns of trade aild pursuing a fixed 
dividend pay-out ratio. Studies include Eckel(1981), McNichols and 
Wilson (1988), Hunt et al. (19961, Subramanyam (1996), DeFond and 
Park (1997), Youi~g  (1998). The evidence on the ineoine smoothing 
hypothesis is however mixed. 
From the above review it is clear that untiB now empirica1 research has 
mainly focused on tlie incentives to manage earnings. Recent research 
also examines  factors that vnight constrain eariiings management. These 
include prior accounting decisions, ownership structure, strength of 
the internal controls, internal governance (especially the existence of 
an audit committee and some characteristics of the board of  direc- 
tors, such as, for example, board size, board composition and separa- 
tion of the fernctions of Chairman of the Board of Directors and @hief 
Executive Officer) and quality of the external audit. 
The impact of prior accounting decisions on earriings management 
was studied by Depond and Jiambalivo (1991). They found that ear- 
niamgs  "manipulation" is more likely in firrns where the rernaining num- 
ber of  income-increasing GUP  possibilities is smalicr. Moreover, 
Sweeney (1994), argues that the accounting flexibility available to 
managers, which is iniluenced by their prior accounting decisions, is 
an important determinant of managers9  accoernting responses to debt 
covenant violation. 
The impact of  ownership structure on earnings management was 
examined by DelFsnd and Siarnbalvo (1991), Warfield et al. (1995) and 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2998). Research results suggest a negative relation between (1) managerial ownership (Warfield et al. (1995)) or 
institutional ownership (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998)) and (2) 
the magnitude of accounting accrual adjustments (=a  measure for the 
extent of earnings management). Earnings "manipulation" was, how- 
ever, found more likely in firms with diffuse ownership (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1991)). 
Further, results indicate that earnings overstatements are less like- 
ly  in firms that have an audit committee (DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1991)). However, no evidence was found that stronger internal con- 
trols reduce the likelihood of  earnings overstatement (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1991)). 
Studies on the impact of the characteristics of the board of direc- 
tors on earnings management (Dechow et al. (1996), Peasnell et al. 
(1998) and Beasley et al. (1996)) find that at least some of those cha- 
racteristics are related to earnings management. 
Further, several studies examine whether a higher quality audit con- 
strains (opportunistic) earnings management more than a lower qua- 
lity audit. The impact of audit quality on both GAAP as wel1 as non- 
GAAP earnings management was tested. Evidence was found of a re- 
lation between audit quality and earnings management within GAAP. 
In particular, Becker et al. (1998) found that discretionary accruals 
for clients of non-big6 auditors are higher than for clients of big6 au- 
ditors. Francis et al. (1997) found that the amounts of  discretionary 
accruals of big6 client firms are lower than those of  non-big6 client 
firms. The evidence on the relation between audit quality and non- 
GAAP earnings management is, however, mixed. Dechow et al. (1996), 
do not find that the use of  a Big6 auditor differs between firms that 
were subject to enforcement actions by  the SEC (that is, firms that 
are "suspectedn to have engaged in non-GAAP earnings manage- 
ment) and the control firms. Higher audit quality was, however, found 
to reduce the likelihood of  errors and irregularities (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1991)) and to increase the likelihood of auditor-client dis- 
agreements over income-increasing accounting methods (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1993)). Finally, Shivakurnar (1998) finds some evidence 
which, he argues, is consistent with auditors limiting managerial dis- 
cretion over accounting procedures. Soine studies do not only examine the factors that induce or constrain 
earnings management, but study also the consequences of actual or as- 
surned earnings management. Thls research is, at the hnoment, li- 
mited ts  the consequences of  earriings management induced by a 
firrn's  relation with capital markets. In particular studies examine 
whether firms (or firm managers) succeed in their attempt Is influ- 
ence their relations with a specific stakeholder, i.e. investors. They pro- 
vide also some evidence on the long run consequeiices of  earnings 
management. 
Several studies examine tlie stock priee effect of  changes in ac- 
counting procedures. Early studies try to discriminate befween kwo 
csmpeting hypotheses, i.e. the mechanistic (hilctional fixation) hy- 
potlaesis and no-eikcts  hypothesis (see Watts aiid Zimmerman (1986)). 
The fint  hypothesis is hased oai the assumption that inlvestors are func- 
tionally fixated, i.e. interpret the earnings number the same way re- 
gardless of the accounting procedures used to calculate them (Wjtts 
and Zimmerman (1986), p.16C). This implies that investors can be 
foo8ed and that stock prices wil1 react to announcements of changes 
in accounting procedures, even when those changes have no cash flsw 
effects. The no-effecks hypothesis, a joint hypothesis of the efficient 
rnarket hypotbesis, the CMM  and the assumptions of zero inforrna- 
tioii, contracting and ~ransactions  cosis, by contrast claims that the 
rnarket can see through the effects of  accounting changes. Conse- 
quently, stock prices should onHy react to announcements of changes 
in accounting procedures when there are cash flow sffects. Studies in- 
clude tbose on  voluntary changes in inventory procedures (LW0 vs. 
FIFO) by for example Sunder (1973 and 19759, Riclis (19823, Biddle 
and Eindahl(l982). Those studies however failed ts discriminate be- 
tween the two competing hypotheses (see Watts and Ziinmerman 
(1986)). 
The early studies asseamed that tax was the only possible cash flow 
effect. Later studies dropped some assumptions of  the no-effeets hy- 
pothesis, i.e. the assumptions of  zero infor~nation  and contracting 
costs. Consequently, changes in accounting procedures could have 
cash flow effects, other than taxes. In particular, those changes could 
irifluence contracting and politica1 costs. This irnplies that accoun- 
ting changes without tax effects couid have stock price effects, even 
when Invesiors are not fu~ictionally  fixated. Those studies did how- ever not try to discriminate between the functional fixation and no- 
effects hypotheses. They ratkner wanted to explain accounting proce- 
dures (Watts aild Limmerman (19861, p.110). For an overview of stu- 
dies, see Watts and %immerman ('(1986),  chapter 12). 
Except for the study of Neill et al. (19951, recent sieidies focus on 
the implications of possible accruals n~anagement  around an IPO or 
seasoned equity offering. Shivakurnar (19981, for example, finds that, 
when firms manage earnings prior to an equity offering, investors al- 
ready recognize this at the equity offering announcement date, which 
suggests that investors cannor be "fooled" by managing earnings. He 
finds also a decrease in tlle stock price response to subsequenl earn- 
ings announcements, which he attributes to earnings management. 
The evidence of  Dechow et al. (1996) suggests however that firms 
managing earrnings do initia%Iy  succeed in their attempt to influence 
investors' perceptioni of  firrn value. They a%so  report that their evi- 
dence suggests that, when earnings management is revealed, increas- 
es in the costs of capital follow. Rangan (6998) and Teoh et al. (1998) 
find that the POOP (stock aind income) performance of seasoned equity 
offerings in the post-offering aainouneement period, can be explained 
by earnings management around or prior to the equity offering. Neiiil 
et al. (1995) find ihat both offering values and kindergricing are re- 
lated t0 accounting mebhod choice. He suggests thak this is not the 
result of opportunistfc earnings management, bilt of accounting rneth- 
sd  choice being a credible signa1 to investors of firm value. 
Resuits as to whether investors are fooled in the short term are thus 
mixed. In the long run, however, the rnarket seems to see through 
earnings manageme~lt. 
III.  INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
ANGLO-SMON AMD NON ANGLO-SMON COUNTRIIES 
From our review of tlie literature (FBower (19971, Bal1 et al. (1997), 
Nobes and Parkcr (1  9951, flexander and Netbes (19941, Joos and Lang 
j1994), FEE (19971, Paisey (1991) and Nobes (1984)) it is elear that 
there exisr instilutional differences hetween countries aioalg varlous 
dimensions. Those are, for exarnple, dlfferences in legaH sgistems, in 
providzrs of finance (in particular, the importante of  capita! mar- 
kets), in ownership and corporate governance and in khe link b,  ptweei~ 
tax and accounting (see, for example, Nobes (1984)). Such factors may 
rause the varioas internatioi~al  diiferences that can be observed in accounting (Nobes (1984), p.3). Differences at the accounting level 
are, for example, a different source of  demand for accounting (that 
is, different goals for financial reporting and different key users of fi- 
iiancial statements), different conceptual frameworks (FEE (1997)) 
and accounting systems, different sources of accounting rules and de- 
gree of  detail in which they are specified. It seems a logica1 conse- 
quence that those differences will, in turn, have an  impact on the abil- 
ity and the incentives to manage earnings. 
In the literature on institutional and accounting differences be- 
tween countries one often classifies countries as either 'Anglo-Sax- 
on' or 'continental European'. Tlie US and the UK are typical exam- 
ples of Anglo-Saxon countries, whereas Germany, France and Bel- 
gium are typical examples of  continental European countries. Some 
countries on the European continent have however characteristics 
which are closer to these of  (typical) Anglo-Saxon countries. In the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, for example, the importance 
of capital markets as providers of finance is very substaaitial, as is the 
case in Anglo-Saxon countries. To  avoid a geographical association 
of countries with a certain category, and because countries are simi- 
lar or different with respect to some institutional characteristic but 
perhaps not another, we believe that a dichotomous classification of 
Anglo-Saxon versus continental European countries is not appropri- 
ate. Further, recent developments in corporate financing and accoun- 
ting have made the (traditional) institutional differences between An- 
glo-Saxon and continental European countries less pronounced, al- 
though important differences still remain. Therefore we first provide 
a discussion of various institutional dimensions along which coun- 
tries can differ in subsection 111.1. and then continue with a discus- 
sion of recent developments in subsection 111.2.. 
A.  Institutional and accounting characteristics of countries 
1. Differences in legal systems, financing and ownership 
a. Common law versus codified law systems 
A country's legal system can be characterized by a common law sys- 
tem or a codified law system. Anglo-Saxon countries typically ope- 
rate under common law systems. In such a system there is only a li- 
mited amount of statute law as only genera1  principles are enacted by 
the legislator (Flower (1997), pp.38-39). The courts then interpret those principles and build up a body of  case law. Most non Anglo- 
Saxon countries operate under codified law systems, which are based 
on Roínan luw and where rules are specified in great detail. The  main 
role of courts in those systems is to enforce the law. 
b.  Large stock market capitalization with 
widespread ownership versus lirnited stock 
market capitalization with concentrated 
ownership 
The major differences in ownership and providers of finance beween 
countries can be summarized as follows. Typical Anglo-Saxon coun- 
tries have wel1 developed capital markets. Companies which are im- 
portant players in the economy are listed on the stock exchange (see 
also Note 1) and in these cornpanies, shares are held by a vast num- 
ber  of  individual shareholders (widespread  ownersbip). In non 
hglo-Saxon  countries, however, capital markets are tgrpically less de- 
veloped, although there is a current trend towards increasing stock 
market capitalization (see subsection 111.2). Only a minority of eom- 
panies is listed on the stock exchange. Funds are mainly provided by, 
for example, banks (this is the case, for example, in Germany) and oth- 
er financial institutions, the state (for example, in France), family 
members or business contacts. Ownership is concentrated (that is, 
there are few shareholders) in both listed and non-listed firms. 
Some figures may illustrate the differences. Stock market capita- 
lization as a percentage of  GNP in 1995 was: 123% in the UK, 82 % 
in the US but only 38% in BePgium, 33% in France and 24% in Ger- 
many. The stock market capitalization in the Netherlands (74%), Swe- 
den (77%) and Switzerland (131%) is however of comparable size as 
in the US and UK (Daems (1998), p.33). 
2.  Accounting differences 
a. Origin of  demanid for finailcial statements 
shareholders versus governrnerat 
The above differences in legal systerns, providers of finance and firins' 
ownership structure have several implications on the accounting le- 
vel. In particular, the differences in ownership structures have an im- 
pact on the demand for accounting information and the users of  fi- 
nancial statements. The fact that in Anglo-Saxon countries funds are obtained from a vast number of individual shareholders raised through 
the capita1  market makes the financial statements an important means 
to communicate information to shareholders. Hence shareholders are 
the main users of published financial statements. Companies are als0 
willing to provide this information to enhance their ability to raise ad- 
ditional funds througb the capital market. By contrast, in non Anglo- 
Saxon countries, where ownership is (even in listed firms) typically 
concentrated, the major providers of finance obtain information through 
direct contacts and internal financial reports. Hn  Germany, for exam- 
ple, bankers have often a seat on the board of directors. Hn  non Ang- 
10-Saxon countries demand for financial information originated main- 
ly from government, who needed this information in order to  plan and 
control the economy or to raise taxes. As companies had little incen- 
tive to make accounting information public, governments made pu- 
blication of financial statements mandatory (FIower (19971, p.41)1. 
b.  Provision of information to capita1 markets 
versus prudent assessment of  distributable profit 
andlor tax assessment 
Differences in ownership structure and related differences in major 
users of financial statements parallel the traditional differences in the 
(traditional) purpose of financial reporting. In the UK and US, the 
important players in the economy are listed companies. The domi- 
nant objective of financial statements in those countries is then als0 
to provide information to capital markets. In non Anglo-Saxon coun- 
tries where third party protection (for example, creditor protection) 
is paramount and demand for financial statements stemmed mainly 
from the government, both prudent assessment of distributable pro- 
fit (to protect third parties) and tax assessment (for government) have 
traditionally been important objectives of financial reporting. Tax and 
financial reporting is closely Linked, whereas in the US by contrast 
companies have to file separate financial statements for tax purposes. 
c.  Substance over form and matching versus 
prudence and historica1 costs 
Differences in objectives of  financial reporting resulted in different 
accounting frameworks, that is, "the fundamental concepts which lie 
behind the accounting law or regulation" (FEE (1997), p.3). The FEE 
((1997), p.8) reports that, in Anglo-Saxon countries the most impor- tant principles seem to be the substance over form and the matching 
principles. In countries where creditor protection is considered a par- 
ticular important objective of financial reporting (like, for example, 
in Germany), special attention is given to a conservative application 
of the prudence and historica1  csst principles. In those countries where 
tax assessment seems to be an important objective of financial repor- 
ting, it is difficult to identify any dominant concepts. 
d.  Profession based accountancy versus law based 
accountancy 
Finally, differences in legal systems as wel1 as different users of finan- 
cial statements are related to different sources of accounting rules and 
the degree of  detail in which they are specified. Nobes ((19841, p.16) 
reports that in code-law countries accounting rules are mainly to be 
found in company Baws,  commercial codes and tax regulations. This 
means that accounting rules are law-based (law-based accountancy). 
These codes usually also specify detailed rules for accounting and fi- 
nancial reporting. In common-law countries, however, it is the ac- 
counting profession itself which effectively governed accounting prac- 
tice, which resailted in detailed accounting standards (profession-based 
accountancy). Company law did not prescribe detailed rules on how 
companies should publish their financial statements2. 
B. Recent institutional developments and their (viable) impact on 
accounting practice 
A fairly recent important evolution in several continental European 
countries is the trend towards a more hglo-Saxon way of  corporate 
financing and accounting. Two factors have been and still are impor- 
tant in this context: (l) accounting harmonization and (2) increased 
risk financing in continental Europe. 
Since the seventies, EC harmonization programs have attempted 
to reduce differences between national accounting systems in EC coun- 
tries (see for example the Fourth and Seventh Directive which deal 
with the annual accounts of individual companies and consolidated 
accounts, respectively). Mthough these directives have been imple- 
mented across member states of  the European Union, many diffe- 
rences remained. In the UK, for example, where accounting was tra- 
ditionally profession-based, several accounting rules were introduced 
into the law (see, for example, Alexander and Nobes (1994), p.84) but this didn't change the key characteristics of tlie British accounting sys- 
tem. While the Fourth Directive provided for example the possibility 
to separate tax and financial accounting, tiie traditional link between 
them still seems to exist in several non Anglo-Saxon countries (FEE 
(1997)). Also, while the true and fair view principle, which is typical 
Angio-Saxon (UK) was adopted in the fourth directive, its practica1 
impact remains limited in non Anglo-Saxon cotintries, as it is often 
interpreted as complying with the rules in these countires (FEE (19971, 
The cfforts of tbe International Accounting Standards Gomsnittee 
(IASC) to harmonize accounting and finaricial reporting across coun- 
tries (IASC core standards pr~ject)~  introduce (some) hglo-Saxon 
thinking outside the Anglo-Saxon world. ThPs harmonization atkempt 
is principally fuelled by the globalization of capital markets and is en- 
courage$ and supported by the Initernationa? Orgaanization of  Secu- 
rities Commissions (IOSCO) and the (US) Secusities and Exchange 
Comission  (SEC) (see for example Zeff (1999), Cairns (1997)). Many 
exchanges (the London stock exchange and Easdaq, for example) a3- 
ready accept that foreign conipanies prepare financial statements ac- 
cording to the International Accou~iting  Standards (IASs) developed 
by  the IASC. Notable exceptioms are khe  New York Stock Exchange 
and Nasdaq. On those exchanges, foreign cornpanies can file finan- 
cial statements prepared using HASs,  but the SEC still requires that 
they reconcile earnings and shareholders' equity to US GAAP Ac- 
cording to the Europeaan Cornmission member states can aPlow com- 
panies to use IASs in preparing their consolidated accounts. Wheth- 
er preparing statements according to US GUP  would fit withln Eu- 
ropean law is nol yet clear however (Batt (1998)). To  avoid double 
work, national regulators in some EU countries already allow, intend 
or consider to allow multinational cornpanies andlor companies that 
are listed on  foreign exchanges to prepare and file their "local" group 
accouiits according to IAS or US GAAP (see for example Batt (B998), 
Belgrado et al. (1998)). Belgian firms for exarnple which are listed on 
a foreign exchange or operate internationally are allowed to prepare 
their Belgian group accounts according to PASS or the foreign prin- 
ciple~  involved (for example, US  GAAP)^. 
Some argue that IASs are doininated by  "the Anglo-Saxon ap- 
proach to financial reporting" (Zeff (1999), p.10)~.  Also, as the WSE 
and Wasdaq do not yet allow financial statements based on PASS, com- 
panies may choose to follow US  Adoption of IASs or US G by non Anglo-Saxon cornpanies definitely introduces Anglo-Saxon ac- 
counting thinking in continental Europe. Companies which (may) un- 
dergo this impact are (1)  inultinational parent companies which have 
to issue group accounts, (2) their foreign subsidiaries which report to 
them and whose figures have to be consolidated in the parent's ac- 
counts, (3) European subsidiaries of  Arnerican cornpanies, and (4) 
companies which are quoted on a foreign exchange. However, PASS 
or US GAAP do not affect al1 non hglo-Saxon companies. Compa- 
nies which do not belong to an international group, andlor which do 
not have t0 issuc group accounts6,  continue to report according ho  their 
national GAAP, when not listed on a foreign exchange. This is stil a 
substantial part of the economy in many continental European coian- 
tries. Further, any compaa~y's  (wkether or nol it sperates internatio- 
nally) individual accounts continue to be based on national GUP.  As 
yet, there is no uniform accounting practice, although differences be- 
tween typical Anglo-Saxon and non hglo-Saxon practice decreases. 
There is a secsnd trend which may be expected to lead t0 a fuerrther 
reduction in institutional and accounting differences. In continental 
Europe, more firrns are looking for risk financing and are findilig their 
miay to the exhanges. Tbe increase in HPOs  over the last years on se- 
veral continental European exchanges illustrates this trend. The ow- 
nership and financing of such companies is tlius changing significant- 
ly, and this will also have an accounting impact. As more firms go pub- 
lic, ownership of  a larger set of  firrns wil1 become less concentrated 
and investors become important users of  financial statements. The 
dominant purpose of finaiicial reporting wil1 shift from creditor pro- 
tection andlor tax assessment to information provision7. Cornpanies 
wil1 be more willing to provide this accounting information, as (1)  they 
depend $o  a larger extent on outside investors for the financing of their 
operations and (2) the coinpetition for outside risk financing increa- 
ses. As users and purposes of financial reporting change, it is reaso- 
nable to expect that accounting frameworks wil1 adapt to fit the con- 
text in which the accounts are used. Overall, hglo-Saxon institutio- 
na1 characteristics are starting to apply in continental European csun- 
tries. IV DHSCUSSHON OF THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTFIONAL 
DIFFERENCES OW  INCENTIVES FOR, OPPORTUNITIES 
84; AND CONSTMINTS ON EARNlNGS MMAGEiVgENT 
Incen~ives  of and constraints on earnings inanagement are mainly af- 
fected by a firni's corporate firrancing, its ownership structure, and the 
accounting environment in which it operaies. Since there exist differ- 
ences between hglo-Saxon and non Anglo-Saxoia companies, the in- 
centives and constraints which were Ernestigatecl in Anglo-Saxon stu- 
dies (see section 11) may not equally apply in continental Europe. 
However, tke trend towal-ds a more hglo-Saxen way of financing and 
accounting in continental Europe (as discussed in subsection 111.2) 
again makes a dichotomous assessment of  earnings management 
differences between hglo-Saon  and non Angio-Saxorm countries im- 
possible. A better assessment, perhaps, would be to discuss differen- 
ces between companies (irrespective  of  nationality) which  have 
Anglo-saxon characteristics (for example, widespread ownership, fi- 
nanced $y capital markets, adopting US GAAP or IASS, ....) and those 
which have not. 
A.  bnstitutional diflerences and incentives for  earnings management 
Our views with respect to incentives for earnings management are the 
following. First, we believe that earnings management induced by ex- 
plicit contracts, such as management compensation contracts and debt 
covenants, might be less important for companies characterized by a 
concentrated ownership structure. With concentrated ownership,  which 
is a typical non Anglo-Saxon characteristic, there are fewer conflict 
of interest and information asymmetry problems between owners and 
managers. Pt  is a fact that bonus plans and debt covenants are less pre- 
valent in non hglo-Saxon  countries. In listed continental European 
firms with concentrated ownership, however, another type of conflict 
of  interest may become important, namely between smal1 and large 
shareholders. 
Differences in systems of  corporate governance also help explain 
the relatively smaller reliance on bonus plans and debt covenants. In 
fact, in continental European countries, providers of  finance (and 
other stakeholders to the company) are more directly involved in cor- 
porate governance, whereas in Anglo-Saxon countries corporate gov- 
ernance relies more on external board members and on monitoring by external providers of  debt and equity capital (Bali (19991, p. 8). In 
Beigium and Germany for example, important providers of  firrance 
have often a seat on the board of directorss. 
Second, tor non-listed eompanies, the incentives to manage ear- 
nings created by capita1 markets (in particular, eamiilgs management 
in order to communicate private information to investors, or ear- 
nings management in view of  saising new funds on capital markets at 
more favorable terms) do not apply. Note that this is still the majority 
of  companies in non Ang'lo-Saxon countries, although there is an in- 
creasing trend in risk financing. 
Third, we believe that the incentives to manage earnings created 
by the political and regulatory process are especially important in non 
Anglo-$axon firms, given the close relationship between financial re- 
porting (in the Individual accounts) and tax reporting. Hf  taxes are as- 
sessed based on profit figures reported in individual accounts, the in- 
centive applies to al1 types of companies (internatianally operating os 
not, listed or iiot). 
Fourth, in contrast to explicit contracts, we expect that implicit con- 
tracts are especially important in creating earnings management in- 
centives in firms with concentrated ownership. Concentrated owner- 
ship might create implicit contracts between a firm and its major share- 
holders, who often have a seat on the board of  directors. Kasanen et 
al. (1996), Itor example, find that (for listed firms) implicit contracts 
on dividends with institutional shareholders can be important in cire- 
ating incentives to manage earnings. 
Fifth, we expect that income smoothing, a particular type of  ear- 
nings management, may be important in non Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Typical explanations for income smoothing in the (hglo-Saxon) li- 
terature are job protection, maximization of compensation and avoi- 
dance of  shareholder interference. These incentives may however be 
less important for firms characterized by concentrated ownership and 
which consequently have a low degree of separation between owner- 
ship (shareholders) and control (management). In those companies 
other incentives are however playing a major role. Tax avoidance and 
pursuing a fixed dividend pay out ratio (see also above) may induce 
firms to engage in this particular type of  earnings management. The 
rationale is the close link between tax and financial reporting (indi- 
vidual accounts), the link between the reported earnings figure and 
dividend payments (see Bal1 (1997), p. 21,  and the potential influence 
of  the (majority) shareholders over those dividend payments. Note that this is especially likely to hold for eariiings management in indi- 
vidual accounts, as both dividend payoibts and taxes are linked to this 
reported earnings number. 
B. I~tstitutional  differences and constraints on earnings nlnnagement 
Opportunities to manage earnings (through accounting decisions) de- 
pend on l-iow flexible the accounting standards are according to which 
financial stateinents are established, together with Ihe degree of en- 
forcement of those standards by the authorities. Bt  is difficult to draw 
general conclusions about differences Bn  flexibility and enforcement 
between Anglo-Saxon and non hglo-Saxon countries. %t  is interes- 
ting to note that there exist large daffeirences, for example, between 
US and UK accounting standards (both Anglio-Saxon countries). The 
latter are considered to be less detailed and allow more RexibiPiQ (see 
for exxample Bal1 et al. (1997)). Further is earnings management through 
accounting decisions in the US restricted by the severe scrutiny of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In non Anglo-Saxon 
countries the law specifies accounting rules in great detail (Iaw-based 
accountancy). %t  is however common knowledge that in some of these 
countries (for example, Germany) earnings that are caIculated a@- 
cording to local  are managed through provisions. This would 
be rather rare in the Anglo-Saxon world (see fsr example Nobes and 
Parker (1995), p.47-48). Note also that earnings cannst only be ma- 
naged through accounting decisions, but also through investment de- 
cisions (for example asset disposals). 
Opportunities to manage earnings may also be different due to  dif- 
ferences in ownership structure. Prior hglo-Saxon research repor- 
ted that ownership structure acts as a constraint on earnings manage- 
ment. The direction of the impact of ownership on earnings manage- 
ment in a typical non Anglo-Saxon setting is not clear. Concentrated 
ownership and hence closer monitoring by  shareliolders (see for 
example Burkart et al. (1997), p. 694) may constrain earnings manip- 
ulation. However, majority shareholders (which have internal infor- 
mation) may also have incentives to manage eariiings in order to trans- 
fer wealth between them and users of financial statements (smal1  share- 
holders and government) who have no access to internal financial in- 
formation. Therefore, it may wel1 be that concentrated ownership no 
longer functions as a constraint on earnings management. Further, it is not clear whether audit quality will function as a con- 
straint on earnings management in non Anglo-Saxon countries. From 
Anglo-Saxon studies there is evidence that audits performed by Big 
Five auditors coristrain earnings management more than audits per- 
formed by non Big Five auditors. In our view, there are two compe- 
ting hypotheses with respect to the impact of  audit quality on earn- 
ings management in non Anglo-Saxori csuntries. The first hypotbesis 
is that, since Big Five auditors are part of an international (Ameri- 
can) group with standardized audit procedures, a simiiar audit qual- 
ity level wil1 be provided by  Big Five audit firms across the world. 
Therefore audit quality wil1 work equally  wel1 as a constraint on earn- 
ings management in non hglo-Saxon  countries. We believe that this 
hypothesis may hold to be true for non hglo-Saxon  firms which are 
Iisted and/or are operating intemationahly. A competing hypothesis 
is the following. As stock markets are less developed in non AngPo- 
Saon  countries and auditing is mandatoq for closely held compa- 
nies which meet certain legal form and size criteria, audit demand has 
a different origin in non Angio-Saxon countries. Many firms, in par- 
ticular closely held firms and firms which are not operating interna- 
tionally, only demand auditing because it is mandatoy and less ss  for 
agency or signalang reasons. Because of lack of voluntary audit de- 
mand, firms wil1 try to fulfill this requirement as cheaply as psssible 
and demand a (relatively lower) level of atadPt quality which Qust meets 
legal requirements. As a result many closely held firms and firms which 
are nol operating internationally appoint non Big Five auditors be- 
cause they are typically cheaper9. Big Five auditors are currently put- 
ting effort in increasing their market share in this market. However, 
to be succesful in this effort Big Five auditors will have to be price 
competitive with local auditors. Avalid question is whether their ser- 
vice wil1 still be quality differentiated from the other suppliers in that 
market. Empirica1 evidence is needed to test which hypothesis holds 
to be truelo. 
1P'Blis paper gresented (i)  a review of the empirica1 earnings manage- 
ment literature, (2) a discussion of the institutional differences be- 
Ween Anglo-Saxon and non Anglo-Saxon countries and (3) a critical 
assessment of the impact of institutional differences on earnings ma- 
nagement. Empirica1 earnings management studies, which are mainly based 
on Anglo-Saxon data, examine the incentives for, constraints on and 
consequences of earnings management. Explicit contracts (such as bo- 
nus plans and debt covenants) as well as implicit contracts were found 
to induce earnings management.  Evidence  also suggests that ear- 
nings are managed (1) to communicate private information to inves- 
tors about future firm value, (2) to sell stock for a higher price or (3) 
to raise additional financing on more favorable terms. Further, the po- 
litical and regulatory process, and some specific circumstances (such 
as labor union contract negotiations, proxy contests, and earnings de- 
creases or losses) induce earnings management. The evidence on ear- 
nings smoothing is mixed. 
There is some evidence that prior accounting decisions, ownership 
structure, audit committees and internal governance (especially some 
characteristics of the board of directors) constrain earnings manage- 
ment. Audit quality was found to constrain within GAAP earnings 
management. Evidence on its impact on non-GAAP earnings ma- 
nagement is, however, mixed. There is conflicting evidence on whe- 
ther investors can be "fooled"  by earnings management in the short 
run. Even if  so, (1) the cost of  capital increases or (2) stock perfor- 
mance declines once earnings management is revealed. Also the in- 
formativeness of  accounting earnings rnay be reduced. 
As major differences exist between non Anglo-Saxon and Anglo- 
Saxon countries, it rnay well be that results of Anglo-Saxon studies do 
not hold in continental Europe. In particular, we argue that earnings 
management induced by  external contracts or a firm's relation with 
capital markets rnay be less important, whereas incentives created by 
the political and regulatony process and implicit eontracts rnay be es- 
pecially important. Also income smoothing is claimed to be impor- 
tant in continental Europe, but the incentives rnay be different. Fur- 
ther, we question whether in continental Europe, a firm's ownership 
structure and the quality of  its auditor rnay constrain earnings ma- 
nagement. Further research in continental Europe is needed to test 
these views. 
NOTES 
1. Note however that also in Anglo-Saxon countries, publication of financial statements 
is mandatory for some types of firms (e.g. listed firms in the US). 
2.  Note though that in the US the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) has legal 
power to establish accounting principles, but has delegated this to the accounting pro- fession. However, the profession cannot ignore the opiriion of the SEC (Baker, Rapac- 
cioli and Solomon (1995)). 
3.  Note that the European commission abandoned the idea of  setting European Stail- 
dards and decided to support the IASC (Zeff (1999)). 
4.  A notable example for Belgium are the 1997 consolidated financial statements of Pe- 
trofina. 
5.  See Zeff  (1999) for more detail on the IASC harmonization program, its core sian- 
dards project and its relation with IOSCO and SEC. 
6.  The obligation to issue group accounts is subject to certain size criteria 
7. Note however that tax assessment is likely to remain a purpose of financial reporting 
i11 non-Anglo-Saxon countries (FEE (1997) p. 12). Information provision through fi- 
nancial reports may be biased because of  the tax influence. But, as (1) tax is usually 
assessed on the basis of the profits in individual financial statements and (2) informa- 
tion needed by capita1 markets is normally provided by  consolidated ones, îinancial 
transparency can be achieved by eliminating the tax effect in consolidated financial sta- 
tements (FEE (1997) p. 12). 
8. Differences in contracting practices inay also be related to differences in legal settings. 
Leuz et al. (1998), for example, conclude that in the US accounting based payout re- 
strictions are included in debt contracts (i.e. the debt covenants) whereas in Germany 
they are mainly mandated (i.e. restricted by law). 
9.  Francis (1984), Palmrose (1986), Francis and Simon (1987), Chan et al. (1991), Francis 
and Stokes (1986) found for example evidence of a big-five price premium in (1) both 
the large and small auditee segmeilts of  the (US, UK or Australian) audit market, or 
(2) the small auditee segment alone. 
10. Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (1998) for example could not find a difference in (the 
amount of) discretionary accruals, which is a measure of  earnings management, bet- 
ween clients of big Five vs non-big Five audit firms in Belgium. 
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